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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Our previous studies (Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff, 1991 and 1992)
and Kotlikoff (1992) introduced the concept of "generational account-
ing," a method of determining how the burden of fiscal policy falls on
different generations. It found that fiscal policy in the United States is
out of balance, in terms of projected generational burdens. This means
that either current generations will bear a larger share (than we project
under current law) of the burden of the government's spending or that
future generations will have to pay, on average, at least 21 percent more,
This paper has been prepared for the annual NBER conference on Tax Policy and the
Economy, Washington D.C., November 1991. Sections of this paper draw on Auerbach,
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on a growth-adjusted basis, than will those generations who have just
been born.
These conclusions were based on relatively optimistic assumptions
about the path of social security and Medicare policies, namely that the
accumulation of a social security trust fund would continue and that
Medicare costs would not rise as a share of GNP. In this paper, we
simulate the effects of realistic alternative paths for social security and
Medicare. Our results suggest that such alternative policies could greatly
increase the imbalance in generational policy, making not only future
generations pay significantly more, but current young Americans as
well. For example, continued expansion of Medicare in this decade alone
could double the 21 percent imbalance figure if the bill for this Medicare
growth is shifted primarily to future generations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed a growing skepticism about the use of the
fiscal deficit to gauge the stance of economic policy. Many economists as
well as noneconomists are questioning whether a single number, that
relates primarily to the government's current cash flow, is the kind of
measure needed to understand the longer term effects of fiscal policy on
saving, investment, and growth. They also ask whether the deficit can
tell us how we are treating different generations, both those currently
alive and those yet to come. Doubts about the deficit have been accentu-
ated by the aging of the U.S. population, with its attendant increase in
the number of retirees dependent on workers for pay-as-you-go spend-
ing and transfer programs.
In recognition of these concerns about the demographic transition, the
U.S. federal government began, in 1983, to accumulate a large social
security trust fund to help finance the social security benefits of the "baby
boom" generation. But this break with short-term, pay-as-you-go financ-
ing also raised new questions about using the unified federal deficit,
which includes social security, as a measure of fiscal policy. If funds for
the future need to be accumulated by the social security system, then
shouldn't such accumulations be excluded from the overall deficit mea-
sure? The federal government's response, as expressed in the 1990 budget
agreement, has been to exclude social security from future calculations of
the deficit. This has not prevented public discussion of the deficit inclu-
sive of social security. Nor has it put to rest the concern that government
spending is now larger and will continue to be larger and that taxes are
now smaller and will continue to be smaller than they would in the ab-
sence of the social security surpluses; that is, it has not put to rest theSocial Security and Medicare Policy131
concern that the federal government is "using" the large pay-as-you-go
social security surpluses to offset large on-budget deficits.
This is but one example of the ambiguity of the deficit and the defi-
ciency of any single deficit measure as a gauge of the fiscal burden faced
by different generations. Although one response to this deficiency has
been to construct different deficits for different purposes, such con-
structs are clearly ad hoc in nature and require continual "refinements"
to prevent perverse results. For example, if the social security system is
excluded from the budget for deficit purposes, how does one deal with
changes in income taxes that are induced by changes in social security
taxes? Should such changes in off-budget taxes be permitted to alter the
on-budget deficit?
The key economic question associated with fiscal deficits is this: Which
generation will pay for what the government spends? No version of the
government's budget deficit provides this information. As we discuss
later, an increase in the deficit does not necessarily signal a shift in the
fiscal burden to future generations. Moreover, policies that dramatically
alter the intergenerational distribution of fiscal burdens may do so with-
out inducing any change whatsoever in the measured deficit.
In earlier papers (Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff, 1991 and 1992)
and in a book (Kotlikoff, 1992), we developed an alternative to the
deficitgenerational accountingand showed how this new approach
could be used to assess fiscal policy and its distributional impact with
respect to different generations. Our previous analysis stressed that gen-
erational accounts are quite informative about the effects of changes in
tax and transfer policies on the burdens of different generations. This
paper uses generational accounting to analyze potential changes in the
federal government's most important transfer program, the Old Age
Survivors, Disability, and Health Insurance (OASDHI), which includes
the old-age Social Security pension system and Medicare. This compo-
nent of the federal budget has grown much more rapidly than other
components in recent years. If current trends continue, OASDHI will
continue to grow relative to the economy due to the increasing share of
the elderly in the population and the rapid increase in real medical costs.
Before turning to such policy analysis, we briefly review the genera-
tional accounting methodology, which is discussed more fully in Auer-
bach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991, 1992).
II. THE GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTING APPROACH
The basic idea behind generational accounting is that generations cur-
rently alive and those yet to be born must pay for the time-path of the132Auerbach, Gokhale, & Kotlikoff
government's expenditures on goods and services less the external re-
sources the government has to cover these expenditures (its net wealth).
This is the government's intertemporal budget constraint. The constraint
reminds us of the zero-sum nature of paying for the government's expen-
ditures; if generations currently alive pay less, generations yet to come
will be forced to pay more. It also reminds us that changes in fiscal policy
today are likely to necessitate changes in the future. We express the
government's intertemporal budget constraint in present value, with the
initial value of government liabilities and the present value of future
spending being equal to the sum of the present values of each genera-
tion's burden. Regardless of the year in which such burdens are im-
posed, emphasizing the present value burdens of different generations
neutralizes the timing problems inherent in annual deficit measures,
and allows us to summarize in a compact form the likely effects of fiscal
policy on individuals through time.
The analysis is forward-looking in that it calculates only the future
fiscal burdens that each generation faces. Because we are interested in
the issue of generational imbalance in fiscal policy, we treat current and
future generations separately when analyzing a particular fiscal policy
path. For current generations, we calculate the burden under the particu-
lar fiscal scenario. For future generations, we calculate the total present
value of payments required to. balance the government's intertemporal
budget constraint. One cannot say how this aggregate burden on future
generations will be distributed across these future generations. For pur-
poses of illustrating the size of the burden likely to be imposed on future
generations relative to that likely to be imposed on current generations,
we assume that the burden on each successive future generation re-
mains fixed as a fraction of the lifetime income of that generation; that is,
the absolute fiscal burderi of successive generations grows at the rate of
growth of their lifetime incomes, which we take to be the rate of growth
of productivity.
To calculate the burden faced by a member of an existing generation,
we first project the net payments to the government in eachfuture year
for a representative member of that generation (distinguishing males
and females) and then take the present value of such payments. By net
payments we mean all taxes paid to, less all transfers received from,
government at the federal, state, and local levels. Payments include not
only direct taxes such as income and property taxes, but also indirect
business taxes, corporate taxes, and seignorage. Transfers include Medi-
care, Medicaid, Food Stamps, Social Security Benefits, and so on.
The present value calculation for each representative individual dis-
counts future payments not only for interest, but also mortality: AnSocial Security and Medicare Policy133
individual's future burden is reduced by the probability that he or she
will not be alive when that burden occurs. Given our assumption that
members of each generation (distinguished only by sex) face the same
survival probabilities, multiplying individual payments in each year by
the generation's projected surviving population for that year provides a
measure of that generation's payment, the separate components of
which are benchmarked to aggregates from the National Income and
Product Accounts.
Once burdens for current generations have been calculated, those
faced by future generations are estimated as a residual, based on the
fiscal balance requirement and the assumption that the remaining fiscal
burden be borne proportionally. Policy changes affect the projected net
payments faced by current generations and, through the fiscal balance
requirement, the burden on future generations as well.
Because the accounts are forward-looking, they do not consider the
net payments made in the past. The present value of future net pay-
ments, which are positive for young and middle-aged existing genera-
tions, are negative for older generations, who are largely retired and
facing lower labor income taxes while at the same time receiving social
security benefits and Medicare. Thus, the level of an existing genera-
tion's account does not indicate how well or poorly that generation has
fared at the hands of the government. We therefore focus on the
changes in each generation's account that are induced by alternative
policies.
III. CONSTRUCTION OF GENERATIONAL
ACCOUNTS
The construction of generational accounts is a two-step process. The first
step entails projecting each currently living generation's average taxes
less transfers in each future year during which at least some members of
the generation will be alive. The second step converts these projected
average net tax payments into a present value using an assumed dis-
count rate and taking into account the probability that the generations'
members will be alive in each of the future years (i.e., actuarial discount-
ing for both mortality and interest).
In projecting each currently living generation's taxes and transfers, we
consider first their taxes and transfers in the base year, in this case, 1989.
The totals of the different taxes and transfers in the base year are those
reported by the National Income and Product Accounts. As described in
detail in Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991), these totals of base
year taxes and transfers are distributed to the different generations ac-134Auerbach, Gokhale, & Kotlikoff
cording to their ages and sexes based on cross-section survey data.
These data include the Bureau of the Census' Survey of Income and Plan
Participation and the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Survey of Consumer
Expenditures. The distribution of future taxes and transfers by age and
sex is assumed to equal that in the current year with adjustments for
growth and projected changes in policy.
Because the government already forecasts the totals of its various taxes
and transfers for many years ahead, the additional work involved in
generational accounting is primarily in allocating these projected totals
by age and sex. Thus, although there are a few additional elements and
the requisite projections extend farther into the future, generational ac-
counting uses mostly the same numbers the government uses, only in a
different manner.
The calculations presented here assume a 6.00 percent real rate of
discount and a productivity growth rate of 0.75 percent. The rate of
productivity growth is based on recent U.S. experience. The discount
rate is higher than the rate of return on government obligations, reflect-
ing the fact that future government receipts and expenditures are risky.1
The estimates also incorporate the mortality probabilities embedded in
the Social Security Administration's projections of the U.S. population
by age and sex. As discussed in Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff
(1991), the absolute value of the generational accounts is sensitive to the
choice of rates of discount and growth as well as rates of birth and death.
But for many of the questions of interest, such as the fiscal burden being
imposed on future generations relative to that being shouldered by cur-
rent generations, the results are quite robust to reasonable departures
from baseline assumptions.
As mentioned, inferring the fiscal burden on future generations re-
quires not only knowing the sum total of generational accounts of current
generations, but also the projected present value of the government's
expenditures on goods and services as well as the government's initial net
wealth position. As described in Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991),
the government's net wealth is estimated in a manner consistent with the
government sector deficit reported in the National Income Accounts. The
1As we discussed in our 1991 paper, the appropriate discount rate to use depends on the
risk characteristics of the flows being discounted. (A similar point has been made by Bohn,
1991). If government receipts and expenditures were roughly proportional to aggregate
fluctuations in income, then the private sector discount rate, measured by the real before-
tax rate of return, would,seem the appropriate discount rate to use. We use a somewhat
lower rate to reflect the existence of countercyclical government policy. In principle, one
would also discount separate components of expenditures and net receipts using different
rates.Social Security and Medicare Policy135
present value of government expenditures is calculated by projecting
current expenditures into the future taking into account those expendi-
ture elements that are sensitive to the demographic structure. For exam-
ple, our projections take into account the decline in per capita spending
on education that is likely to arise as the school-age population declines
relative to the total population.
Our baseline generational accounts reflect policy as of 1989 (prior to
the 1990 budget agreement). They show that a newborn male faced a net
payment to the government of $73,700, reflecting present values of
$85,300 of tax payments and $11,600 of transfers received. For females,
the comparable figures are $36,400 in net present value, comprising
$54,700 in taxes and $18,300 in transfers. The lower taxes for females
primarily reflect their lower rate of labor force participation, and hence
lower income and payroll taxes. The higher transfers reflect greater fe-
male longevity and the concentration of female-headed households in
circumstances of poverty. Together, Medicare and social security ac-
count for nearly half of all transfers received by males, and over a third
of those received by females.
Based on our estimates of initial government wealth and the projections
of the effects of this baseline fiscal policy on existing generations, we find
that, as of 1989, generational policy was out of balance in the sense that
the fiscal burden on future generations was 21 percent larger than that on
1989 male and female newborns, who are assumed to fall under the cur-
rent policy regime. As the net lifetime payments newborns are projected
to make represent almost 40 percent of their lifetime incomes, this imbal-
ance in generational policy translates into an added burden of nearly one
tenth of the income of members of future generations.
An alternative way of measuring how far the current regime is out of
generational balance is the change in any particular fiscal instrument
that would be necessary to bring this 21 percent excess to zeroto make
the "new" current policy sustainable without further adjustment. Our
calculations suggest that an immediate and permanent increase in the
average income tax rate of 5.3 percent (just under 1 percentage point)
would suffice. If, instead, payroll taxes were used to equalize the bur-
den, they would have to rise by 7.8 percent, or about 1 percentage point.
Alternatively, a rise in sales taxes of 10.2 percent (just over 1 percentage
point) or a 14.3 percent rise (nearly 4 percentage points) in capital in-
come taxes would be required. Although any of these fiscal instruments
(or many others) could be used to provide intergenerational balance,
each policy change would lead to a different burden on current and
future generations. The most favorable to the young and future genera-136Auerbach, Gokhale, & Kotlikoff
tions are sales taxes, more of which would be paid by older individuals.
At the other extreme, not surprisingly, are payroll taxes. Hence, genera-
tional balance may be achieved with a range of impacts on particular
generations2
IV. GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTING AND DEFICITS
The usefulness of generational accounting is immediately clear when
one compares the effects of specific fiscal polices ondeficits and genera-
tional accounts. Policies that change the pattern of generational burdens
need not affect the deficit, while other policies may change the deficit
without affecting the pattern of generational burdens. This is illustrated
by Table 1 (reprinted by permission from Kotlikoff 1992), which present
simulations of the effects of four different, but not unusual, policies.
The first of these policies is a five-year, 20 percent reduction in the
average federal income tax rate, with the tax rate increased above its
initial value after five years to maintain a constant debt-to-GNP ratio.
This policy would raise the deficit and shift the fiscal burden to young
and future generations, not a surprising result. The second policyan
immediate and permanent 20 percent increase in social security retire-
ment and disability benefits financed on a pay-as-you-go basis by in-
creases in payroll taxeswould induce a quite similarshifting of fiscal
burdens without any change in the time path of measured deficits (in-
cluding or excluding the social security system). The third policy in-
volves an equal revenue switch in tax structure, a permanent 30 percent
cut in payroll taxes financed by increased sales taxes, which, again,
shifts generational burdens without changing the deficit.
The final policy illustrated in Table 1 involves the elimination of the
discount that presently exists in the price of existing assets as a result of
investment incentives. Removing this discount (as would be accom-
plished by extending the tax treatment of new assets to existing assets) is
essentially a windfall grant to owners of existing capital. We assume in
the simulation that this grant is paid for by a permanent increase in
capital income tax rates, a policy shift that transfers resources from the
young (who, on average, have not yet accumulated significantwealth) to
the old (who, on average, have).
As the simulations in this section indicate, the generational effects of a
variety of realistic policies cannot be determined by looking at deficits.
We turn now to an examination of several social security and Medicare
policies that may actually be adopted through time.
2See Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1992) for further discussion.Social Security and Medicare Policy137
TABLE 1.
Changes in Generational Accounts Arising fromFour Hypothetical
Policies (present value, thousands of dollars).
V. THE GENERATIONAL IMPACTSOF
SOCIAL POLICIES
A. Social Security's OASDI Program
We first consider policies to alter thestructure of the OASDI (non-
Medicare) portion of the social securitysystem. As a result of the in-
creases in payroll taxes mandated by the 1983 changes, thisprogram has
in recent years been running large cash flow surplusesof roughly 100
billion dollars per year. Although these accumulationswere planned to














0 1.9 2.7 1.0 0.9
10 3.2 3.9 -1.3 1.5
20 2.2 5.5 -6.5 2.3
30 -0.3 5.2 -8.8 2.1
40 -2.7 2.4 -7.5 0.2
50 -4.4 -2.7 -3.8 -2.5
60 -5.0 -10.2 0.7 -4.7
70 -2.6 -11.9 3.4 -5.0
80
Future
-1.6 -7.3 2.8 -4.0
generations 1.9 3.1 0.4 0.2
Females
Ages
0 1.0 1.0 3.5 0.4
10 1.7 1.5 3.2 0.6
20 0.7 1.9 1.5 0.8
30 -0.2 0.9 1.8 1.2
40 -1.0 -1.0 2.4 0.6
50 -1.9 -4.5 3.1 -0.5
60 -2.1 -10.0 3.9 -1.8
70 -1.5 -11.0 3.9 -2.4
80
Future
-0.9 -7.5 2.8 -2.4
generations 1.0 1.1 3.8 0.1138Auerbach, Gokhale, & Kotlikoff
combined with historically high payroll tax rates, haslent force to argu-
ments for reducing payroll taxes. Cuttingpayroll taxes is not, in itself, a
full description of a fiscal policy, however;payroll tax cuts alone would.
cause a violation of thegovernment's fiscal balance requirement. A com-
plete policy specification also requires acompensating change either in
net government receipts or spending(or both). This section presents
simulations for four such policies and their effects onthe fiscal burdens
of different generations.
The first of the four policies considered is aproposal to cut the social
security payroll tax rate over the next threedecades and to increase the
tax rate thereafter. The secondpolicy involves the same reduction in
payroll taxes (through the year 2020) as in the firstsimulation, but rather
than raise tax rates after 2020, this policy reducessocial security benefits
beginning in that year by the same amountthat payroll taxes otherwise
would have increased. The third policy entailsthe indirect dissipation of
the social security trust fund though an increasein government spend-
ing over the next three decades equal, on anannual basis, to the social
security surplus. Over these decadesfunds to pay for the increased
government spending are "borrowed" sothat in 2020 the additional
accumulated federal debt is equal in magnitude tothe social security
trust fund. The fourth policy is animmediate and permanent switch
from payroll tax finance to income tax financeof social security.
The first column of Table 2 indicates whatreducing and then increas-
ing payroll taxes will do to the burdensplaced on different generations.
The policy provides windfalls to Americanscurrently alive, with the
exception of the very old and the very young.Those currently aged
thirty to forty receive the largest windfalls,roughly $3,000 for males and
$1,500 for females. These gains come at the expenseof children currently
under age ten as well as future individuals. Ifall future Americans are
treated uniformly, up to the growth adjustment,their lifetime net pay-
ments will rise by $6,100, in the caseof males, and $3,000, in the case of
females.
Enactment of a policy that promises to raisefuture taxes to pay for
current tax cuts does not ensure that such taxeswill actually be raised.
The government might use an alternativemethod to restore fiscal bal-
ance. For example, the necessaryincrease in net payments might take
the form of a cut in social security benefits.Such a policy, depicted in the
second column of Table 2, reduces by about onethird for males and by
about two thirds for females the gains enjoyedunder the initial policy.
Females lose relatively more because their shareof social security bene-
fits is larger than is their share of payroll tax payments.
The third column in Table 2 shows what happensif the federal govern-Social Security and Medicare Policy139
TABLE 2.
Changes in Generational Accounts from Four Social Security Policies
(present value, thousands of dollars).
Males
Ages
ment indirectly dissipates the social security surplus by raising its spend-
ing beyond the amount projected in the baseline generational accounts.
In the simulation, the government continues to accumulate its social
security trust fund, but it also borrows to pay for additional spending
with the annual amount of the borrowing equal in size to the annual
social security surplus. We assume this process of deficit-financed in-
creased spending continues through 2020, and that after 2020 the govern-
0 1.3 0.3 4.1 -2.4
10 -0.2 -0.6 4.0 -3.6
20 -2.3 -1.8 2.9 -4.4
30 -3.4 -2.2 1.5 -1.0
40 -3.2 -2.5 0.6 4.4
50 -2.0 -1.8 0.2 8.4
60 -0.7 -0.7 0 9.6
70 -0.1 -0.1 0 7.7
80 0 0 0 4.5
Future
generations 6.1 3.8 5.2 -2.5
Females
Ages
0 0.6 0.4 1.9 -2.0
10 -0.3 -0.1 1.9 -3.1
20 -1.4 -0.6 1.5 -4.2
30 -1.7 -0.5 0.9 -2.0
40 -1.5 -0.6 0.4 1.3
50 -1.0 -0.5 0.1 4.2
60 -0.4 -0.4 0 5.6
70 0 0 0 4.8
80 0 0 0 2.2
Future
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ment raises income taxes to pay interest less an adjustment for growth
on the additional accumulated official debt.
This policy has quite different effects from those in the previous simula-
tions, since, unlike policies that do not change direct government spend-
ing, increases in government spending may eventuate in an increase in
the sum of all generational accounts. Here, this added burden is borne by
all generations who will be alive to service the extra debt, with the greatest
burden on those currently young and those yet to be born. How this
translates into the net impact on each generation depends on the size and
distribution of the benefits of the added spending. Certainly if the benefits
are spread over only those currently alive, theunborn will lose.
The final simulation in Table 2 shows the effects of a change in the
method of financing social security benefits. Over the years some have
argued that the connection between payroll taxes and OASDI benefits is
sufficiently weak that there is little reason to rely on the payroll tax as a
source of finance. The policy change consideredhere would replace the
payroll tax with the income tax as the method of finance, immediately
and permanently. Although such a change has been advocated for a
variety of reasons, including a desire to use a more progressive source of
revenue, our simulation considers only the generationaleffects of the
switch. We find that those under forty stand to win, and those over forty
stand to lose, because income taxes are levied on income from assets as
well as income from labor, and older individuals receive a bigger share
of asset income than labor income.
The generational implications of using general revenue finance to pay
for social security are spelled out in the last column of Table 2. On
average, sixty-year-old males and females would beforced to pay $9,600
and $5,600 more, respectively. Forty year-old males and females would
suffer respective losses of $4,400 and $1,300. In contrast, males and
females who are now age ten would benefit by more than $3,000 each.
The policy also would represent more than a $2,000 lifetime net payment
break to future generations.
In summary, the results in this table show that one cannot simply
analyze the effects of a cut in payroll taxes; it is necessary to specify what
replaces these taxes. The simulations suggest four possible routes: In-
creased payroll taxes in the future, reduced benefits in the future, reduc-
tions in government spending, and replacement with income taxes.
Each has its own effects on the generational fiscal burden.
B. Medicare Policy
Many observers have worried about the rising level of health care costs
in the United States, which spends a much larger fraction of GNP onSocial Security and Medicare Policy141
health care than any other OECD country. After the United States,Can-
ada is the country with the highestper capita health care spending, but
the Canadians spend almost30percent less per person. At present,
about$0.12of every dollar of U.S. output goes to healthcare, compared
with$0.06in1960. Bythe turn of the century the figure is projected to be
$0.17.And if the growth of health care is unabated, the figure will reach
$0.37by the year2030(see Darman1991).
What explains the rapid growth in realper capita U.S. health expendi-
hires? Since1960slightly over half of the growth simply reflectsex-
panded use of health care services and facilities. Another third of the
growth is due to the price of medical care rising relative to the prices of
other goods and services. And the remaining 11or so percent of health
expenditure growth reflects the aging of the population. This aging of
America will, of course, intensify in the years ahead.
The growth of health care expenditures has potentiallyenormous
implications for government outlays and the well-being of differentgen-
erations. Consider just the federal government's expenditureson Medi-
care. These payments currently constitute7percent of total federal out-
lays. According to the Office of Management and Budget,Medicare is
projected to exceed30percent of the federal budget by2025. Tosupport
Medicare at its current levels alone, either the federal budget would
have to grow far beyond its current level of about20percent of GNP or
the rest of the budget would have to decline bymore than20percent in
real terms.
If Medicare's growth is not curtailed, how will its additionalcosts be
financed? Given its cash-flow accounting, Medicare, like OASDI, will be
reporting cash-flow surpluses over most of this decadeas the HI (health
insurance) component of payroll taxes grows. But by the end of the
decade the higher payroll tax receipts will fall short of the increased
Medicare spending, leading, in short order, to the exhaustion of the
Medicare Trust Fund.
If and when the HI trust fund is dissipated, thegovernment may raise
payroll taxes, or may simply "borrow" from the OASI (Old Age Survivor
Insurance) and DI (Disability Insurance) Social Security trust funds.In-
terfund social security borrowing has occurred in thepast, and would
delay the eventual need to raise payroll taxes, possibly until the burdenof
these higher taxes fell primarily on generations not yet born. Accordingto
Medicare's actuaries, the HI payroll tax may have to rise by anywhere
from6to16percentage points. Because the combined employer-
employee social security payroll tax is currently justover15percent, the
uninhibited growth of Medicare expenditures could eventually requirea
doubling of social security taxes.142Auerbach, Gokhale, & Kotlikoff
The generational accounts considered thus far were based onthe as-
sumption (perhaps naive) that medical expenditures will grow nofaster
than the rest of the economy. In light of the past growthof Medicare,
Table 3 considers two alternative growth rates for Medicare expenditures
over the 1990s. In the table Medicare outlays inthe 1990s are assumed to
grow at either a 2 or 4 percent higher ratethan the rest of the economy.
After the turn of the century the Medicare growth rate isassumed to
equal the economy-wide growth rate. The 2 and 4 percent growth rates
bracket the 2.77 rate of growth of health spending in excessof GNP
observed between 1960 and 1989. The 4 percent growth rate is consistent
with projections of an increase, over the decade, from 12 to 17 percentin
the share of U.S. health care spending relative to GNP.
For each growth rate there are three alternative financingscenarios.
The first is that future generations pick up the entire bill forthis decade's
projected higher Medicare growth. The second is that the growth in
Medicare over the next decade is ultimately paid for by areduction in
Medicare benefits starting in the year 2020. The third is that thisdecade's
growth in Medicare is matched, on an annual basis, with increases inHI
payroll taxes.
The three scenarios have markedly different implications forboth liv-
ing and unborn generations. Under the first scenario,the burden is
entirely shifted onto future generations; all living generationsbenefit
from the growth in Medicare, because they do not have to pay forit.
Depending on the growth rate assumed, future generationsend up
paying from 10 to 23 percent more than in the base case. IfMedicare
growth is 4 percent, the absolute increase in the bill handed to ourmale
descendants is $19,400; it is $9,000 for our female descendants.These
additional burdens raise substantially the ratio of total net paymentsof
the unborn to those of newborns. Rather than paying 21 percent more
than newborns, future generations in the 4 percent growth scenarioend
up paying almost 50 percent morethan newborns.
The second scenario, given in columns 2 and 5, indicateswhat hap-
pens if, instead of borrowing fromthe Social Security Trust Fund, Medi-
care pays for its prospective near-termgenerosity with longer-term (after
2020) benefit cuts. In this case, individuals below agefifty lose, because
of the net cuts in Medicare benefits in their retirement. Notealso that
today's older individuals experience the same large gainsfrom Medicare
growth as in the previous financing scenario for the simple reason that,
by assumption, the projected Medicare benefit cuts do not beginfor
thirty years.
The third financing mechanism, which involves annual increases inHI
payroll taxes to pay for the excess Medicare growth, is explored inCol-Social Security and Medicare Policy143
umns 3 and 6. This scenario hurts an even larger fraction of those alive,
but has the smallest effect on members of future generations, whose net
payments rise by roughly the same proportion as those for individuals
age thirty and under. As in the previous cases, members of older genera-
tions, who have essentially retired and ceased paying payroll taxes,
enjoy roughly the same gain from the near-term growth in Medicare.
Given the persistent growth of health care costs, one might ask how
much more extreme these results would be if Medicare spendinggrew as
a share of GNP not for the next decade but, say, for the next three
decades. We repeated the simulations in Table 3 under the assumption
TABLE 3.
Changes in Generational Accounts from Medicare Policies
(present value, thousands of dollars).





















0 -0.2 0.1 1.6 -0.5 0.3 3.4
10 -0.4 0.2 2.1 -0.9 0.5 4.6
20 -0.6 0.4 2.3 -1.4 0.8 4.9
30 -1.0 0.7 1.6 -2.2 1.6 3.6
40 -1.6 0.1 0.4 -3.5 0.1 0.7
50 -2.7 -1.9 -1.6 -5.9 -4.2 -3.5
60 -4.2 -4.2 -3.9 -9.2 -9.2 -8.5
70 -3.6 -3.6 -3.5 -7.7 -7.7 -7.5
80 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -4.3 -4.3 -4.3
Future
generations 8.9 3.3 2.0 19.4 7.1 4.3
Females
Ages
0 -0.3 0.2 0.7 -0.7 0.4 1.5
10 -0.5 0.3 0.9 -1.2 0.7 1.9
20 -0.8 0.5 0.7 -1.8 1.1 1.5
30 -1.3 0.9 0 -2.9 2.0 0
40 -2.1 0.3 -1.2 -4.7 0.6 -2.6
50 -3.5 -2.0 -3.0 -7.8 -4.5 -6.6
60 -5.5 -5.5 -5.3 -11.9 -11.9 -11.6
70 -4.9 -4.9 -4.9 -10.7 -10.7 -10.6
80 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -6.2 -6.2 -6.2
Future
generations 4.2 1.8 0.8 9.0 3.8 1.9144Auerbach, Gokhale, & Kotlikoff
that Medicare grows at a rate 2 percent or 4 percent faster than GNP until
2020. Not surprisingly, the burden on future generations grows consider-
ably under these assumptions, but the extent of this growth depends on
the policy being simulated. If Medicare costs rise at a rate 2 percent faster
than GNP and benefits are eventually cut (in 2020), the added burden on
future males would rise from $3,300 to $12,600; that on females from
$1,800 to $6,000. At the other extreme, the "worst case" scenario is when
Medicare grows at a 4% faster rate until 2020, and only future genera-
tions pay. In this case, the added burden on future males rises from
$19,400 to $62,100, that on females from $9,000 to $26,200. Given that
our baseline simulations assign futuremales and females total fiscal
burdens of $89,500 and $44,200, respectively, we see that sustained Medi-
care growth has the potential of absorbing asignificant share of the
government's overall budget.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have estimated that the United States' policy path, based on current
law and the assumption of balanced growth in government spending,
will place a roughly 21 percent larger growth-adjusted net tax burden on
future generations than it will place on Americans who have recently
been born. But this estimate is based on what may be relatively optimis-
tic assumptions: That the social security system's projected cash-flow
surpluses wifi continue to accumulate and that Medicare spending will
immediately stabilize as a share of GNP. Those individuals coming in the
future as well as today's infants and young children could end up paying
considerably more under less optimistic but realistic alternative paths for
social security and Medicare policies.
Specifying a different path for payroll taxes or Medicare costs is not
enough to describe an alternative fiscal policy: one must also indicate
how the government will compensate for either of these changes in
order to preserve intertemporal fiscal balance. Though we know some
balancing response must occur, the ultimate path cannot, of course, be
known with certainty; we have considered several alternatives in each
case.
The social security policies we have analyzed include short-term pay-
roll tax cuts financed by long-term payroll tax increases, future benefit
cuts, or general revenue finance, as well as the dissipation of theim-
pending social security "off-budget" surpluses through increased "on-
budget" deficits. Our simulations for Medicare consider alternative
responses to the continued growth of Medicareexpenditures as a share
of GNP. The use of generational accounting reveals, as deficit account-Social Security and Medicare Policy145
ing cannot, the relative burdens that these different policyresponses
place on different generations.
REFERENCES
Auerbach, Alan J., Jagadeesh Gokhale, and LaurenceJ. Kotlikoff (1991). "Gen-
erational Accounts: A Meaningful Alternative to Deficit Accounting."In Tax
Policy and the Economy. David Bradford, ed. National Bureauof Economic
Research, vol. 5, 55-110.
(1992). "Generational AccountingA New Approachto Understanding
the Effects of Fiscal Policy on Saving." Scandinavian Journalof Economics, forth-
coming.
Bohn, Henning (1991). "The Sustainability of Budget Deficitsin a Stochastic
Economy." Working paper, Wharton School, University ofPennsylvania,
July.
Darman, Richard (1991). "Introductory Statement: The Problemof Rising Health
Costs." Testimony presented before the Senate Finance Committee,Executive
Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, April16, p. 6.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J. (1992). Generational AccountingKnowing WhoPays, and
When, for What We Spend. New York: The Free Press, forthcoming.